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Abstract
For years now political scientists have been asking questions about why the Middle East remains one of the
world’s least democratic regions. Given the recent Middle East war and the United States’ current project to
build a democracy in Iraq, the question seems more significant than ever.Yet the topic continues to puzzle
researchers around the globe as they contribute to a growing body of possible explanations for the
phenomenon.While these explanations vary widely in form, they also reflect a constant and underlying
question regarding what factors inhibit the formation of sustainable Middle Eastern democracies. This paper
examines one such model in the context of contemporary Egypt to test its relevance to events actually
occurring in the Arab world.
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For years now political scientists have been asking questions about why the Middle
East remains one of the world’s least democratic regions. Given the recent Middle East war
and the United States’ current project to build a democracy in Iraq, the question seems
more significant than ever. Yet the topic continues to puzzle researchers around the globe as
they contribute to a growing body of possible explanations for the phenomenon. While
these explanations vary widely in form, they also reflect a constant and underlying question
regarding what factors inhibit the formation of sustainable Middle Eastern democracies.
This paper examines one such model in the context of contemporary Egypt to test its rele-
vance to events actually occurring in the Arab world.
Democratization theories that seem to work in other areas of the world break down in
the Middle Eastern context. For example, some theorists studying Eastern European coun-
tries draw a positive correlation between economic development and democracy (Bunce).
According to such models, oil-rich Arab Gulf states possess distinct advantages in forming
democratic systems. Nevertheless, the governments of these countries repeatedly turn to
hegemonic measures to reinforce their autocratic leadership—demonstrating the irrele-
vance of such theories to Middle Eastern politics in the process.
Other political scientists studying Latin American democracies have cited economic
performance as a positive influence on the formation of democratic governance (Remmer).
Such scholars argue that poor economic performance creates popular dissent and alienates
the ruling elite from the working classes. In many countries this popular dissent translates
into calls for political liberalization and economic reform, thereby creating conditions that
encourage democratic advancement. Though this phenomenon is not linked to any partic-
ular political system, its effects are more acute for authoritarian regimes that create chasms
between the political elite and general population. Still, the theory weakens when applied to
many Middle Eastern regimes where despite frequent destabilizing fluctuations in vital eco-
nomic markets, many governments have resisted reform and maintained social control.
The limitations of these two variables in the Middle Eastern context spurred some
political scientists to explore other, more unique characteristics of Arab economies to
explain the democracy gap. One theorist proposed that natural resource endowment in
many of the oil-rich Arab Gulf states gives the illusion of wealth in terms of GDP without
translating into economic empowerment for most citizens (Ross). Thus, the wealth distribu-
tion, democratic achievement, and power structures of many Middle Eastern countries are
comparable to states with much lower GDP figures. This model may offer a partial explana-
tion of the political environment in Muslim countries, but it is by no means exhaustive.
Many Islamic countries with relatively few natural resources located across Asia Minor and
North Africa possess authoritarian systems similar to their oil-rich neighbors, and this real-
ization has prompted researchers to search for other explanatory options.
As illustrated by these disappointments, economic-based theories of democracy often
fail to explain the political environment of many Arab states. Consequently, many 
theorists have turned to non-economic explanatory variables to understand the question.
Political heritage represents one variable used to comprehend democratic change in other
parts of the world. Many models assume that former British colonies democratize more
readily because the legacy of colonial government institutions predisposes future democrat-
ic development (Weiner). Alternately, some argue that a communist political heritage
impedes future democratic advancement because its presence produces an antidemocratic
political culture (Fish). The inadequacies of this model once again become apparent in the
Middle Eastern context, however, where brutal forms of hegemonic and political control are
exhibited by countries possessing both forms of political heritage.
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Ethnic diversity represents a final non-economic variable adapted from the study of
other world regions to explain the Middle Eastern political situation. According to research
on new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, societal fragmentation along
ethnic or racial lines problemizes political consensus-building and predisposes populations
to violent interactions that quickly inhibit normal democratic processes (Horowitz).
Homogeneous societies, on the other hand, avoid this conflict by narrowing the field of
possible political alternatives to a set of commonly acceptable boundaries. Once again, how-
ever, Arab states hold exception to the model by exhibiting below average levels of demo-
cratic performance compared with ethnic fragmentation.
The insufficient explanation provided by these commonly cited variables led many in
the political science field to search for alternate modes of understanding Middle Eastern
politics. One current hypothesis linking Arab nations to autocracy argues that Islam as a
religio-social institution precludes liberal democratic foundations such as individual human
rights and majoritarian rule (Fish). Studies promoting this idea contend that Islam instead
favors either strong authoritarian systems that provide cohesion to a single religiously guid-
ed worldview or consensual-based systems that rely heavily on pre-existent patterns of
patriarchal and tribal authority. Although most scholars concede that Muslim cultures are
no more religiously-convicted than other societies, it is nevertheless assumed that a prevail-
ing Islamic worldview can seriously inhibit democracy.
Subsequent research points to certain errors in this analysis. An examination of the
electoral gap in Muslim countries found that autocratic governance is not as much an
attribute of Islamic states as it is of Arab ones (Stepan and Robertson). Further empirical
observation comparing Freedom House and Polity Project ratings for Muslim majority
countries with and without majority Arab populations while controlling for factors of eco-
nomic strength and significant democratic experience reveals that “16 Arab countries form
the largest…group among…states that ‘underachieve’ [democratically]…[but] the world’s
31 Muslim-majority but non-Arab countries…form the…largest bloc…that ‘greatly over-
achieve’” (30). Since little or no evidence connecting Islam to autocratic governance exists,
researchers are left to speculate on the reasons for the Arab deficiencies.
In an attempt to make sense of these empirical observations, Brumberg introduces a
model that separates Islamic states into two distinct interpretive categories (Brumberg,
“Islamists and the Politics of Consensus”). This treatment asserts that “to say that someone
is Muslim tells us little regarding that person’s views on politics [because] the supposition
that there is one Muslim identity that trumps all others is erroneous” (109). Alternately, it
advocates looking at unique differences in the political and institutional tools used by vari-
ous Muslim countries to explain the democracy gap. The study identifies the terms har-
monic and dissonant as two distinct categories of governance and observes that “the chal-
lenge is not to figure out whether Islamism is ‘essentially’ democratic versus autocratic…it is
to see whether this or that Islamist group is acting within a hegemonic [harmonic] political
arena…to shut out alternative approaches, or else within a competitive [dissonant]…arena
where [they must] accommodate the logic of power-sharing” (112). According to this defi-
nition,“dissonant states create a multipolar arena that abets competition and negotiation
[while] harmonic states…create a unipolar field that can easily become a place for deadly
games of ‘winner takes all’ between rulers and their opponents” (113).
Evidence from outside the Arab world supports this claim as studies exploring Muslim
views of democracy in former Soviet Union reveal that factors such as education and the
national economy explain attitudes towards democracy more than religious identification
(Rose). The idea of the common Islamic identity breaks down due to variations in religious
observance and because Muslims represent diverse social and economic classes that cannot
be simplified for political analysis. Dissonant political strategies take advantage of such
diversity by incorporating Islamists, liberal democrats, secularists and other groups into
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legitimate political dialogue-thereby bolstering state legitimacy while diffusing specific
political successes and failures.
Other recent political studies agree with these preliminary findings by positing that
the search for legitimacy in times of economic instability yields increased pluralism and
political incorporation (Hudson). While this development may not necessarily yield
increased democracy as earlier theorists expected, it is a step towards what Brumberg calls
“liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg,“The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy”). The advantages of
such a dissonant system over absolute harmonic hegemony include increased human rights,
official opposition activity, and greater government transparency. However, autocratic rulers
are seldom enthusiastic supporters of political liberalization and often offer serious resist-
ance to broad-based reform.
Contemporary studies are less optimistic about the prospects of democratic reform in
the Arab world. Although a shift in the Middle Eastern political climate is apparent, no sin-
gle explanation can account for past democratic deficiencies or predict future political
developments in the region. Observable advances toward political pluralism were made in
the past fifteen years as shown in the rise of new dissonant liberalized autocracies. The
future of these systems, however, is a subject of ongoing debate. Some fear the redoubled
oppression witnessed in Algeria as autocratic regimes attempt to regain solitary control over
political, social, and economic spheres of influence. Others predict that a new generation of
oppressive theocratic Islamist rulers will replace the fading autocratic regimes. Yet, the hope
for democracy is not lost as in some cases, “Inclusion [may breed] moderation…and
Islamists who reject undemocratic behavior in exchange for inclusion will be trans-
formed…from destabilizing antisystem parties into acceptable representatives of a legiti-
mate ideological trend” (Langohr 117).
The Egyptian Case
An interesting example of the way these democratic issues and political transforma-
tions react with one another to produce new and novel forms of authority can be found in
contemporary Egypt. Modulating between liberal and hegemonic policies, the country is a
prime example of dissonant politics in the modern liberalized autocracy. As home to many
well-organized dissonant political groups including the Muslim Brotherhood, secularist lib-
erals, a large women’s liberation movement, and one of the Middle East’s only regional
human rights organizations, the political elite face considerable opposition. Still, repressive
tactics are regularly mixed with gestures of liberalization as the Egyptian government con-
tinually attempts to maintain its monopoly on legitimate social and political interpretation
(Brownlee).
This general pattern seen across the Arab world led one theorist to observe,“The
trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective repression…is
not just a survival strategy adopted by authoritarian regimes, but rather a type of political
system whose institutions, rules, and logic defy any linear model of democratization”
(Brumberg,“The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy” 56). Brumberg’s model of dissonant and
harmonic regimes may hold the key to understanding a new form of political system exhib-
ited by regimes like Egypt where necessary accommodations lead to pluralistic political
participation but do not inevitably translate into greater democratic governance. In other
words, increased inclusion of opposition parties in Egyptian politics should not necessarily
be interpreted as a process leading towards democratization but instead signifies a new type
of Middle Eastern political system.
This study assesses developments within Mubarak’s Egypt to examine the usefulness of
Brumberg’s dissonant/harmonic paradigm in understanding political events across the Arab
world. The traditional autocratic ruling elite of the country commonly uses hegemonic
measures to maintain political, social, and religious control and may therefore be compared
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to other repressive regimes across the Middle East region. Additionally, the substantial and
organized nature of opposition movements within the country make it a crucial case for
interpreting gestures of power-sharing and dissonant politics in other portions of the Arab
world.
Past studies attempting to explain the Egyptian political environment examined the
government’s reaction to issues of economic reform, elections, Islamist incorporation, con-
stitutional abuses, human rights, and gender equality as indicators of democratization
(Brownlee; Goodson and Radwan; Beattie; Aly). However, despite this careful inclusion of
variables and thorough study design, many of these studies failed to account for Egyptian
developments precisely because they assumed a linkage between these factors and demo-
cratic growth-an assumption proven ineffectual by the stubborn persistence of autocratic
governance in the country.
Nevertheless, the variables considered in past studies remain present in Egyptian soci-
ety and relevant to politics on the national level. By examining changes in each of the
above-listed country-level indicators throughout Mubarak’s rule, this study shows how the
ruling political elite periodically incorporates or cooperates with opposition groups in an
ongoing quest for legitimacy and stability. This is the logic of dissonant politics-to integrate
political opposition into a competitive field of ideological rivalry for the mutual benefit of
the various players involved (Brumberg,“Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia”).
Measuring each of these indicators will involve extensive use of past political studies
as well as statistical reports compiled by various domestic and international watch groups.
Analysis of economic liberalization and market reform can be found in past studies (Fisher;
Lögren; Sadowski) and in reports tracking current economic developments in Egypt and
other member countries compiled by the International Monetary Fund and the United
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (International Monetary Fund,
International Financial Statistics Yearbook; The United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia,“Survey of Economic and Social Developments in the
ESCWA Region”). Information on election fairness relies primarily upon the contributions
of two important country surveys (Fisher; Brownlee), while data regarding Islamist political
incorporation originates from both former studies and a human rights watchdog group
(Fisher; Ismail; Human Rights Watch,“Egypt: Human Rights Developments”). Supplemental
information regarding constitutional abuses is provided by two past studies and more
recent publications released by Human Rights Watch and Freedom House. (Brownlee;
Fisher Human Rights Watch Backgrounder,“Elections in Egypt”; Freedom House,“Freedom
in the World”). Finally, accounts of human rights activity and women’s liberation in Egypt
can be found in reports compiled by one political scientist and various non-governmental
agencies1. All variables will be measured and operationalized at the country-level over the
period of Mubarak’s leadership in order to make explicit the large-scale developmental
changes contributing to Egypt’s current political situation.
Contextualizing the data within the dissonant/harmonic model of political authority
rather than assuming its linkage to democratic change will result in a more accurate expla-
nation of why and how the Egyptian political climate took its current form. Such an
approach contributes valuable methodological insight to the analysis of other Arab regimes
vacillating between liberal and hegemonic political behavior by suggesting a paradigm that
can explain the seemingly erratic nature of government actions. Furthermore, political
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1 Refer to Crystall; Amnesty International,“Database of Human Rights Reports and Articles for Egypt”;
Human Rights Watch,“Divorced for Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt”; Human
Rights Watch,“Egypt: Human Rights Developments”; The United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Central Asia,“Where do Arab Women Stand in the Development Process? A Gender
Based Statistical Analysis”; The World Bank Group,“Gender Stats.”
developments must be viewed in light of Middle Eastern conceptions of democracy and the
limitations brought upon them by contemporary political situations-a combination that
necessitates the formation of new non-linear theories of democratic development. The
model of dissonant incorporation is one such non-linear paradigm with broad applicability
across the Arab world that seriously explores issues arising in liberalized autocracies with-
out submitting to the urge to predict imminent democratization.
Economic Reform
The effects of economic reform on internal and external government legitimacy make
Egyptian economic policy decisions an important resource for observing dissonant politics
in action. Large amounts of foreign debt accumulated over the last twenty years have created
a dilemma for Mubarak’s government. External agencies like the IMF and USAID as well as
individual creditor countries favor drastic reform measures such as the devaluation of the
Egyptian pound to reduce annual trade deficits, increasing interest rates to limit spending,
and loosening government price controls to help manage debt. However, the short-term
political cost of applying such policies discourages the government from implementing lib-
eral reform except under severe pressure. The story of how Mubarak has negotiated these
pressures and alternated between Western demands and internal political expediency reveals
much about the current government’s attitude towards reform and illustrates one way in
which liberal concessions can be used to maintain long-term political legitimacy.
When Mubarak succeeded President Anwar Sadat in 1981, he inherited a host of eco-
nomic problems that plagued Egypt since the mid-1970s. An extensive consumer-subsidies
program, large foreign trade deficits, and mounting government debt contributed to
increased pressure for economic reform. However, past failures at market liberalization such
as the deadly riots sparked by a 1977 bread price increase pointed to the political conse-
quences of such action and discouraged the government from moving quickly. Declining
oil revenues throughout the 1980s and relative inflation of national debt payments—to 71%
of all national commodity exports in 1986-forced some government compromise between
the demands of foreign debtors and the Egyptian population (Sadowski 29).
Several internal structural changes were implemented throughout the 1980s in
response to these ongoing pressures. Throughout the decade, the government attempted to
streamline Sadat-era fiscal policies and bring the national economy more in line with mar-
ket forces by attracting foreign banks, creating new international banking institutions, and
curtailing the growth of unregulated Islamic investment companies. The most drastic of
these reforms were implemented between 1987 and 1989 when Mubarak consolidated the
four formerly separate state banks into a single Central Bank that adjusted official exchange
rates daily to reflect real market values. The immediate effect of this reform was the devalu-
ation of the Egyptian pound by over more than 60% from $1 = 1.36 to $1 = 2.17 (Sadowski
38; Fisher 334). The consequences of such a change for ordinary Egyptians may be
observed in a time series graph of the consumer price index (Fig 1).
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The years following the 1987 reforms reveal sharp price increases alongside a relative drop
consumer purchasing power—a trend that only recently began to level off.
Liberal reform continued through much of the 1990s until it finally began to stagnate
in 1999 in response to ongoing government overspending and widespread dollar shortages.
Preliminary legislation in the new millennium suggests a retreat from floating exchange
rate policies and further economic reform as the Central Bank begins to interfere with for-
eign exchange markets in response to short-term currency shortages stemming from lack-
luster tourism and the war in Iraq.
In conjunction with the institutional restructuring of the late-1980s, Mubarak conced-
ed to foreign and IMF pressures to raise interest rates to levels reflecting inflation. Central
Bank lending interest rates were subsequently raised two points from 15 to 17% between
1986 and 1988 (Sadowski 38). While this adjustment may appear drastic following a six
year period with no rate adjustment, the reform remains short of the country’s 20% infla-
tion rate (Fig. 2 below).
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devaluation of the Egyptian pound to reduce annual trade deficits, increasing interest
rates to limit spending, and loosening government price controls to help manage debt.
However, the short-term political cost of applying such policies discourages the
government from implementing liberal reform except under severe pressure. The story of
how Mubarak has negotiated these pressures and alternated between Western demands
and internal political expediency reveals much about the current government’s attitude
towards reform and illustrates one way in which liberal concessions can be used to 
maintain long-term political legitimacy.
When Mubarak succeeded President Anwar Sadat in 1981, he inherited a host of
economic problems that plagued Egypt since the mid-1970s. An extensive consumer-
subsidies program, large foreign trade deficits, and mounting government debt
contributed to increased pressure for economic reform. However, past failures at market
liberalization such as the deadly riots sparked by a 1977 bread price increase pointed to
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quickly. Declining oil revenues throughout the 1980s and relative inflation of national
debt payments—to 71% of all national commodity exports in 1986—forced some
government compromise between the demands of foreign debtors and the Egyptian 
population (Sadowski 29).
Several internal structural changes were implemented throughout the 1980s in
response to these ongoing pressures. Throughout the decade, the government attempted 
to streamline Sadat-era fiscal policies and bring the national economy more in line with
market forces by attracting foreign banks, creating new international banking institutions,
and curtailing the growth of unregulated Islamic investment companies. The most drastic
of these reforms were implemented between 1987 and 1989 when Mubarak consolidated 
the four formerly separate state banks into a single Central Bank that adjusted official
exchange rates daily to reflect real market values. The immediate effect of this reform
was the devaluation of the Egyptian pound by over more than 60% from $1 = 1.36 to $1
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The peak of interest rate reform came in 1991 when banks were allowed to set deposit
and lending rates virtually unencumbered by government regulation. However, this
seemingly liberal policy remained untested through the 1990s because the Egyptian
economic boom occasioned few opportunities to test Mubarak’s commitment to reform.
Current interventions in foreign exchange policy may foreshadow a return to past interest
rate policies, and despite continued pressure for liberalization, Mubarak remains a
cautious reformer—exhibiting the political expediency of compromise and limited
concessions in the dissonant political arena.
As perhaps the most inflammatory issue in Egyptian economic policy, price
control adjustment receives much attention from foreign and domestic reformers alike.
Costs from government subsidies and controls for agricultural products and foods stuffs
The peak of interest rate reform came in 1991 when banks were allowed to set deposit and
lending rates virtually unencumbered by government regulation. However, this seemingly
liberal policy remained untested through the 1990s because the Egyptian economic boom
occasioned few opportunities to test Mubarak’s commitment to reform. Current interven-
tions in foreign exchange policy may foreshadow a return to past interest rate policies, and
despite continued pressure for liberalization, Mubarak remains a cautious reformer—
exhibiting the political expediency of compromise and limited concessions in the dissonant
political arena.
As perhaps the most inflammatory issue in Egyptian economic policy, price control
adjustment receives much attention from foreign and domestic reformers alike. Costs from
government subsidies and controls for agricultural products and foods stuffs gradually rose
throughout the 1980s as the national population and food import dependency grew and oil
revenues shrank. Sudden price increases in these state-distributed necessities have histori-
cally triggered food riots from the government’s poorest constituents. Revealing a lack of
cooperation among the upper-classes, merchants with state-sponsored monopolies failed to
respond to a system of “‘friendly pricing’ in which the ‘lords’ were supposed to raise their
own prices gradually and pass along a share of the profits to the farmers” (Sadowski 36).
In the early 1990s the government finally responded to its budget crisis by reducing subsi-
dies on certain foods, agricultural resources, and energy products. The most drastic of these
reforms focused on the energy market and resulted in a 50 to 170% price increase between
1990 and 1991 (Löfgren 409). Also during this time, the government began loosening
restrictions on foreign trade and private investment, and in an attempt to stimulate further
price adjustment, export bans were lifted on over one hundred important agricultural and
industrial products. The combined effect of these measures has brought prices on many
goods closer to international levels, but resistance to further reform from both inside the
government and the general population precludes complete liberalization.
The inefficient and bureaucratic government structure and an overriding desire to
maintain political stability form two major impediments to price adjustment from within
the regime. Lack of cooperation between government ministers with differing constituen-
cies produces a situation where “agreements negotiated with one minister [are] often vetoed
by others, and meetings with the full cabinet…[reveal] diverse and contradictory positions”
(Sadowski 34). Additionally, an overwhelming concern for political stability overshadows
any reform discussion as the threat of mass demonstration and popular revolution weighs
into all regime decisions. Pressures from vested economic interests in both the public and
private sectors also factor into government liberalization policies as powerful business own-
ers stand to lose much from loosened price controls. Finally, continual assurance of
renewed aid from Western countries helps to alleviate debt concerns and allow for compla-
cency on reform measures (Löfgren 410). Keeping in line with the rules of dissonant poli-
tics, Mubarak has responded to these pressures with partial concessions and snail-paced
reform in order to maintain a maximum amount of government stability while appeasing
his foreign creditors.
Elections
The skillful use of elections as a tool to reinforce government legitimacy plays an impor-
tant role Egyptian dissonant politics. By co-opting and pacifying important dissent parties in
times of regime weakness, Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) protects its own
political dominance and institutional place. Periods of political strength allow for use of hege-
monic political powers to ban rival parties, silence dissent groups, and fix elections to ensure
continued NDP dominance in the Egyptian parliament. By examining the shifting positions
of Mubarak’s government toward political opposition, one can better understand how disso-
nant politics contribute to the overall stability of the current autocratic regime.
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Muhammad Hosni Mubarak ascended to power as head of the NDP and president of
Egypt after the assassination of President Sadat in October of 1981. His response to this
national emergency foreshadowed the type of president he would become, and in the
months following the failed coup, hundreds of Islamist group members were arrested, tried,
and sentenced for crimes in connection with the assassination (Fisher 301). The state of
emergency gave Mubarak the chance to consolidate his newfound power in the NDP and
national politics. Despite these hegemonic exercises of control, however, Mubarak still
lacked popular legitimacy. The 1984 elections would be crucial in re-establishing both the
NDP and Mubarak in national leadership.
Unwilling to risk too much in their quest for a popular mandate, the NDP-controlled
parliament passed a law before the election that “required parties to gain a minimum 8% of
the total vote in order to be represented in the People’s Assembly” (Fisher 301). Because of
this restriction, only one opposition party—the New Wafd Party—was able to gain seats in
the new legislature. Representation proportions created by this requirement are visible in
figure 3 and reveal a clear victory for incumbent NDP candidates. Although Mubarak
secured the popular mandate he was seeking, the questionable constitutionality of the eight
percent law and charges of coercion and election fraud tainted his victory and led to fur-
ther political instability.
Responding to Supreme Constitutional Court rulings that the 1984 election had
indeed been unconstitutional, parliament passed electoral reform laws that restructured
independent representation in the People’s Assembly. Parliament was dissolved by public
referendum in 1987 so these laws could take effect and elections were set up for later in the
year. Alliances between opposition parties created greater competition for the NDP in this
election and the number of majority-controlled seats in the legislature indeed reduced, but
with 346 seats, the NDP maintained a resounding majority. Once again, the government
certified the results amid minority party allegations that intimidation and electoral fraud
were decisive in the NDP victory.
In 1990, the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that “elections to the People’s
Assembly in 1987 had been unconstitutional because the electoral law promulgated in 1986
unfairly discriminated against independent candidates” (Fisher 304). Mubarak responded
quickly by dissolving parliament and setting up national elections in November and
December of that year. Furthermore, in an outward display of concern for democratic
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independent representation in the People’s Assembly. Parliament was dissolved by 
public referendum in 1987 so these laws could take effect a d elections were set up for
later in the year. Alliances between opposition parties cre t d gr ater compe ition for the
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government certified the results amid minority party allegations that intimidation and 
electoral fraud were decisive in the NDP victory.
In 1990, the Supreme Constitutional Court rul d that “elections to the People’s
Assembl in 1987 had been uncon titutional becaus the electoral law promulgated in 
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reform, the eight percent electoral threshold laws were repealed to allow for real competi-
tion between the NDP and its fragmented opposition. Amid this relatively liberal environ-
ment, independent election to the People’s Assembly grew to its highest proportions in
recent Egyptian history. Yet, Mubarak resisted the implementation of impartial election
monitoring, and fraud still marred the election results. Additionally, many of the independ-
ent candidates joined the NDP following the election—giving the party 404 of the 444 par-
liamentary seats or slightly more than a 90% majority.
This semi-liberalized electoral system continues today as Mubarak repeatedly feigns
movement towards greater democratization only to violently suppress developing political
opposition. For example, the 1995 elections promised to be the most direct confrontation
between the NDP and its Islamist opposition yet, but in the months leading up to the
polling date, Mubarak’s government launched some of the largest anti-Islamist raids since
Sadat’s assassination. These raids not only resulted in one thousand arrests of Muslim
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad members but also severely crippled Islamist aspirations to
political power (Fisher 310). The 2000 elections followed a similar pattern as Mubarak
promised independent judiciary supervision of polling places but strictly limited the judges’
ability to prevent intimidation and fraud (Brownlee 8-10). Both of these elections ultimately
served to reinforce and solidify NDP control over government activities despite an outward
show of reform.
As illustrated by the five People’s Assembly elections examined above, the Egyptian
government occasionally responds to crises of legitimacy by proposing measures towards
electoral reform. The sincerity of such reforms, however, remains highly suspicious, and the
NDP repeatedly resorts to hegemonic measures of intimidation, arrests, and fraud to ensure
its continued political dominance. As highlighted by figure four, the NDP has never slipped
below a three quarters majority in the legislature during Mubarak’s presidency. This
unchecked rule precludes all but the most superficial forms of election reform as the NDP
uses its electoral dominance to perpetuate its own majority status.
The riddle of Egyptian dissonant politics lies in this insincerity. Mubarak and the NDP
continually propose commissions and inquiries to investigate and combat electoral abuse,
only to later obstruct the basic recommendations of such committees. The logic of disso-
nant politics argues that governments seek to optimize both power and stability. By contin-
ually proposing election reform and institutionalizing criticism in the form of limited
opposition, Mubarak hopes to placate serious opposition movements and increase govern-
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ment legitimacy and stability. Too many liberal concessions may trigger a loss of legislative
dominance, while too few could lead to uncontrolled dissent and popular revolution.
Dissonant theory provides a context for understanding the Egyptian government’s seeming-
ly erratic actions as a coherent attempt to balance authoritarian leadership and popular
legitimacy in the form of a liberalized autocracy.
Islamist Incorporation
Because Islamic parties represent the most sustained challenge to NDP dominance in
Egyptian national politics, government policies toward Islamist incorporation are highly
related to the issue of electoral liberalization. The legalization of limited political opposition
in the second half of the 1970s triggered a slight increase Islamist activity, but the 1981
assassination of President Sadat by militant Islamists led to widespread repression of
Islamic organizations and increased authoritarianism. Mubarak assumed office amidst this
climate of national emergency and continues to struggle with the dilemma of how to rein-
corporate Islamic opposition into national politics while ultimately limiting its influence
and maintaining regime stability.
Islamist involvement in Sadat’s assassination and a failed popular uprising led to wide-
spread government repression of a variety of Islamic groups. Mubarak initially responded
to the crisis by arresting over three hundred members of Jama’ah al-Islamiyah (Islamic
Jihad) in connection with the coup attempt, but subsequent bannings and dissolutions also
affected other more moderate groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) (Fisher 301).
This pattern of Islamist suppression continued for two more years until political opposition
was once again legalized, and the reformation of the New Wafd Party in alliance with the
MB reasserted Islamist influence on the national political scene.
Islamist presence fell short of translating into real political power, however, as mini-
mum threshold laws passed before the 1984 election ensured continued NDP dominance.
Mubarak sustained his policies of political self-preservation through discriminatory elec-
toral laws, hegemonic coercion, and widespread fraud over the remainder of the decade
until Islamist violence escalated in the early 1990s. By this time, the failure of MB accom-
modation to bring about Islamic reform led to widespread disillusion in more radical
Islamist circles (Ismail 201-22). Members of Islamic Jihad and other radical Islamist organi-
zations reacted to MB disappointments with a campaign of political assassinations and
tourist attacks that killed seventy people by the early months of 1992, and violent attempts
to overthrow the government resulted in the loss of 1.5 billion dollars in tourism revenues
by the end of the year (Fisher 306).
Mubarak countered the aggression with a military campaign against radical Islamist
organizations that was widely criticized by human rights organizations for its heavy-handed
approach. These conflicts represented the first large-scale and overt violence since Sadat’s
assassination and marked a distinct change in government-Islamist relations. Especially in
the opposition stronghold of northern Egypt,“the upsurge in violence…[prompted] a huge
deployment of security forces…massive search and arrest operations, controversial new
‘anti-terrorism’ legislation…and a wave of human rights abuses affecting not only suspected
Islamists but also ordinary citizens” (Human Rights Watch,“Egypt: Human Rights
Developments”). These actions were followed by increased press censorship and the disso-
lution or co-option of several professional trade organizations with MB leadership.
Despite Mubarak’s new policy of restraining Islamists at gun-point, anti-government
violence increased, and by 1994, government forces had gathered over 29,000 radical dissi-
dents through military action and mass arrests (Fisher 308). In response to growing politi-
cal violence and a perceived loss of local control, the NDP moved to consolidate its power
by abolishing local elections and replacing Islamist sympathizing local mayors with
Ministry of Interior appointments. This action was officially framed as an effort to elimi-
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nate Islamist strongholds and curb the violence that plagued many northern regions of the
country, but opposition groups and international watch organizations criticized the meas-
ure as an instance of hegemonic authoritarianism.
Continued attacks from radical Muslim groups through the rest of the decade failed to
overthrow Mubarak and the NDP dominated government. Instead, the violence served to
justify further government repression, and moderate Islamic parties such as the MB suf-
fered under increased NDP political opportunism. Repeated arrests of MB leaders and ban-
nings of MB candidates in national elections served to marginalize the group, and by 1997,
the Brotherhood simply began boycotting elections in a display of peripheral dissent
(Fisher 311). These developments in the late 1990s marked the most severe period of state
repression through legislation and military intervention, but events at the turn of the centu-
ry created hope for political normalization in opposition parties.
Political violence calmed following Mubarak’s third reelection and calls by several
imprisoned leaders of radical Islamist groups for a unilateral ceasefire on political attacks.
In return, the Egyptian government accelerated the release of Islamist political prisoners
and by September of 1999 claimed the release of “over 5,000 Islamist detainees…[although]
human rights groups claimed this still left 15,000 in detention” (Fisher 312). The Islamist
turn toward peaceful modes of government resistance continues with few exceptions into
the present day, and the government has reacted positively with the cessation of large-scale
military activities. However, state interest in Islamist politics remains high, and Mubarak
consistently uses the state-controlled Political Parties Committee to limit Islamist participa-
tion in national elections.
Responses to Islamist challenges to NDP political dominance varied tremendously
over the last twenty years from military intervention and sweeping arrests to partial institu-
tional incorporation. Beneath these changes lies a basic need to limit competition from
moderate Islamic groups like the MB without inciting violence from radical organizations
or more generalized public discontent. By pursuing a dissonant political agenda, Mubarak
allowed limited competition from conservative Islamic parties in times of NDP strength
but used brutal measures of hegemonic control to eliminate opposition in times of NDP
weakness. The Egyptian government thus follows no set policy for dealing with Islamist
competition. Rather, it reacts to opposition actions and the prevailing political environment
to maximize both its control and legitimacy in the national political sphere.
Constitutional Abuses
Constitutionality and the problem of constitutional abuse in Mubarak’s Egypt are per-
haps difficult to gauge given that the country is now in its twenty-third year of a nearly
constant state of emergency. The astounding flexibility given to the ruling party under such
conditions gives little incentive for change. Still, the Supreme Constitutional Court does
occasionally exercise its powers of constitutional review to hold the NDP accountable for
extreme legal transgressions. Because a large number of high-profile constitutional viola-
tions involve NDP election activities, it is instructive to examine closely the recent contro-
versy surrounding the 2000 national election to understand the dynamic relationship
between Egyptian courts and the elected government.
In late 1999, Mubarak made his customary gesture towards political inclusion by
announcing that “the coming elections to the People’s Assembly would be ‘subject at all
stages to supervision by the judiciary’” (Brownlee 8). Of course, legislation limiting judicial
abilities to supervise the upcoming elections was subsequently passed. The NDP thereby
hoped to force the judiciary into validating election results that would undoubtedly be
mired by intimidation and fraud. However, in a rare exercise of its constitutional powers,
the Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that “legislation governing parliamentary elections
was unconstitutional due to the absence of full judicial supervision” (Human Rights Watch,
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“Egypt: Human Rights Developments”). The implementation of such a ruling required the
deployment of judicial officials at every national polling place for all three rounds of the
People’s Assembly elections. Despite logistical difficulties involved with such an effort, the
judiciary succeeded in ensuring orderly proceedings in each round of the election.
Meanwhile, the NDP used its broad legislative and bureaucratic powers in an attempt
to secure its own continued political dominance. In the months leading up the election, the
government-run political parties committee refused legal recognition to the SLP and Labor
parties and dissolved several Islamist organizations in an overt attempt to limit electoral
competition. The MB also came under increased attack as twenty senior members were
arrested and tried for belonging to and recruiting for an illegal organization (Human Rights
Watch,“Egypt: Human Rights Developments”). These strategic arrests severely limited MB
members or supporters running as independents in the upcoming election and served as a
warning to other Islamist opposition parties executing similar plans. Even during the elec-
tion, the government restricted the presence of judges to the counting stations—leaving
voters outside polling places open to extensive intimidation (Fisher 316).
The combined effect of these measures produced an election that did receive official
judicial supervision but remained highly flawed and undemocratic. The NDP once again
secured a ruling majority in the People’s Assembly and Islamist parties were relegated to the
political sidelines. Most importantly, however, Mubarak wrestled in a political struggle with
the Supreme Constitutional Court and came out victorious—a result which increased his
leverage against the institution and sent a clear signal warning against further constitutional
challenges. Yet the political cost of such an overt use of electoral intimidation and fraud in
overcoming the judiciary is evident in the 15 to 40% participation rate through all three
rounds of elections.
Despite the 23 year state of emergency that allows Mubarak considerable constitution-
al flexibility, the Supreme Constitutional Court still periodically offers constitutional chal-
lenges to NDP rule. The controversy surrounding the 2000 People’s Assembly elections
serves as a good example of how the elected government benefits from independent judici-
ary in terms of legitimacy and yet consistently evades court decisions to ensure NDP domi-
nance and maintain the status quo. Dissonant politics within the liberalized autocracy man-
date such actions to protect authoritarian rule while outwardly displaying political
reform—a trademark of the Mubarak government throughout its tenure in office.
Human Rights and Gender Equality
The first human rights organization in the Arab world was formed in Cairo in 1983 as
a response to political and civil abuses perpetrated by various regimes in the Middle East
region. The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR), as the movement became
known, received mixed reactions from many of the authoritarian regional leaders. AOHR
staunchly opposed Islamist programs of political reform that autocratic leaders feared
would soon gain popular support, but the organization also threatened to restrict many of
the governments’ hegemonic measures of political and social control. The logic of Egyptian
dissonant politics dictated a careful compromise between government endorsement and
overt suppression of the group.
The debate was especially strong in Egypt where the new organization chose to center
its activities and began pressuring Mubarak to release political detainees. The question was
officially answered later that year, however, when AOHR “members presented their declara-
tion to the United Nations, [and] their home countries, in an unusual display of unity,
joined forces to deny them the consultative status they sought” (Crystall 14).
Acknowledging partial defeat, the group moved underground and began meeting “unoffi-
cially,” like so many other organizations in Egypt, maintaining a vicarious existence under
the watchful eye of the Egyptian state security service. Since that time, activists founded the
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Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) and international human rights group
activities increasingly focus on Middle Eastern developments. Yet, these groups have little to
show for all their efforts, and Mubarak remains highly ambivalent towards policy reform.
Ironically, the agendas of Islamist and human rights groups in Egypt during the 1980s
were remarkably similar. AOHR formed partially in response to the mass arrests and politi-
cal detentions of Islamists following Sadat’s assassination, and organizations such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International have widely criticized the Egyptian government
for its treatment of political opposition. The greatest challenge to human rights in recent
Egyptian history occurred during the struggle between Islamic militants and the Egyptian
government in the early 1990s, when government oppression reached its highest levels
since Sadat’s assassination. In one 1992 account of government security abuses, Human
Rights Watch wrote,
There were widespread arbitrary arrests. Persons were detained on mere sus-
picion or because they had beards; periods of detention typically ranged from
fifteen to thirty days. Relatives of wanted suspects-including mothers, sisters and
wives, and children as young as eight years old-were arrested "to force [suspects]
to give themselves up or to obtain information from victims as to their where-
abouts." (Human Rights Watch,“Egypt: Human Rights Developments”)
The cessation of widespread Islamist attacks in the late-1990s marked a shift of focus
for human rights groups operating in Egypt. Many organizations continued working for the
release of political prisoners but also began calling for political reform and increased elec-
toral competition in government elections. Increased pressure for intellectual freedoms,
women’s rights, and ending the twenty year old state-of-emergency imposed after Sadat’s
assassination were also primary goals for human rights groups. Still, government response
to such calls is slow and insincere as evidenced by previous sections of this paper address-
ing Mubarak’s failures to abstain from constitutional abuse and implement election reform.
The controversial struggle for women’s rights in Egypt reveals much about the general
struggle for human rights the country. Since efforts at women’s liberation began shortly
after the 1952 Nasserist Revolution, the movement has experienced great advances and
severe disappointments as the role of women in public continually advances and retreats
following changes in the Egyptian political climate. Institutional setbacks characterize much
of Mubarak’s presidency and include a 1985 Supreme Constitutional Court decision that
invalidated many of the rights gained during Sadat’s presidency. In spite of these difficulties,
however, growth in the women’s workforce throughout the 1980s changed popular attitudes
towards women in public, and women’s literacy rates and school enrollments are now at all
time highs (fig. 5)2 .
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Unfortunately for these activists, the application of the Sharia system to family law
precludes similar progress in private life, and women remain the subject to widespread gen-
ital mutilation in rural areas and unequal divorce rights (Human Rights Watch,“Divorced
From Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt”). Because Islamist radicals jeal-
ously guard against encroachments on traditional law, institutional reform in the near
future seems unlikely, and Mubarak has remained indecisive about these issues despite
great pressure from the international community. Limitations on both women’s and human
rights are thus dictated by overriding concerns of regime survival in contemporary Egypt,
and current conditions present little incentive for NDP-sponsored reform.
Conclusions
Egyptian government policies toward economic reform, electoral fairness, Islamist incor-
poration, constitutional abuses and human and women’s rights seem inconsistent and erratic
over the last twenty-five years. Fluctuations in Mubarak’s enthusiasm for political reform defy
the logic of linear theories of democratic development and make predicting the futures of
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and the Middle East a dubious process for political scientists
working in the region. However, by abandoning the confines of linear political thought, one
may begin to observe a pattern of common underlying motives dictating regime policy.
The non-linear theory of dissonant politics addresses these problems by explaining
how authoritarian regimes selectively mix hegemonic measures of political control with
more benign strategies of co-option, incorporation, and limited reform to balance regime
stability and political power in the modern nation-state (Brumberg,“Dissonant Politics in
Iran and Indonesia”). According to this theory, authoritarian regimes may be divided into
dissonant and harmonic conceptual categories to facilitate better understandings of individ-
ual policy decisions. Harmonic regimes such as pre-occupation Iraq and Saudi Arabia rep-
resent traditional totalitarian dictatorships by jealously guarding social and political power
from would-be rivals with overt and often violent measures of political oppression.
Alternatively, dissonant regimes like Iran and Lebanon allow limited social and political
criticism to maximize both regime legitimacy and stability. This strategy of liberalized
autocracy is ideal for leaders of countries with large amounts of foreign debt and heavy
internal and external pressure for reform.
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Mubarak’s presidential actions seem to support this theory. For nearly twenty-five
years, he has paced between democratic reform and hegemonic totalitarianism in an
attempt to silence his many critics on subjects of economic reform, electoral fairness,
Islamist incorporation, constitutional abuses, and human and women’s rights. Ultimately,
this balanced approach towards autocratic liberalization translated into political longevity
for the president while other leaders straying to far toward either reform or control fell sub-
ject to democratic transformations or violent revolutions. Understanding this basic desire
for political longevity is the key to understanding NDP political policy—too much compro-
mise brings freedom and the possibility of real political competition but too little jeopardiz-
es legitimacy and state security.
Brumberg argues for the wider applicability of this theory throughout Arab world and
possibly even in much of the authoritarian third world, and indeed, dissonant political
thought may prove relevant in diverse situations. However, the paradigm’s resistance to
complex empirical analysis limits its usefulness. Real countries exhibit varying degrees of
dissonant political action, and this often complicates the placing countries into such a dual-
istic theory. Distinguishing between political measures that fit the model and actions that
do not requires extensive background knowledge and the collection of information that is
frequently unavailable for third world and Arab states. The combination of these factors
causes the theory to be cumbersome and nearly impossible to test with any accuracy—
making precision and external reliability major challenges to its wider application.
Despite these limitations, the dissonant/harmonic political paradigm still works better
at explaining contemporary Middle Eastern politics than older linear models, and this
makes the theory attractive to many political scientists working in the region.
Understanding political developments in Egypt provides a model to help facilitate more
perceptive treatments of politics in other Arab countries-an advance that may ultimately
influence international perceptions of the region and improve foreign policy decisions
regarding the Middle East as a whole.
Works Cited
Aly, Abdel Monem Said. “Democratization in Egypt.” American Arab Affairs 22 
(Fall 1987), 11-27.
Amnesty International. “Database of Human Rights Reports and Articles for Egypt.”
(2004) http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-egy/index
Beattie, Kirk J. “Prospects for Democratization in Egypt.” American-Arab Affairs 22 
(Fall 1987), 31-47.
Brownlee, Jason. “Democratization in the Arab World?  The Decline of Pluralism in 
Mubarak’s Egypt.” Journal of Democracy 13 (October 2002), 6-14.
Brumberg, Daniel. “Democratization in the Arab World?  The Trap of Liberalized 
Autocracy.” Journal of Democracy 13 (October 2002), 56-68.
. “Dissonant Politics in Iran and Indonesia.” Political Science Quarterly
116 Fall 2001), 381-411.
. “Middle East Studies after 9/11: Islamists and the Politics of Consensus.”
Journal of Democracy 13 (July 2002), 109-115.
Bunce, Valerie. “Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations.”
Comparative Political Studies 33 (August-September 2000), 703-734.
Crystall, Jill “Democratization in the Middle East: The Human-Rights Movement in the 
Arab World.” American-Arab Affairs 36 (Spring 1991), 14-16.
Res Publica 37
Fish, Steven M.“Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55 (October 2002), 4-37.
Fisher, W. B. “Egypt.” Regional Surveys of the World: The Middle East and North Africa 2004,
50th ed. London: Europa Publications, 2004.
Freedom House. “Freedom in the World” (2004).
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/countryratings/egypt.htm>.
Goodson, Larry P. and Soha Radwan. “Democratization in Egypt in the 1990s: Stagnant, or 
Merely Stalled?” Arab Studies Quarterly 19 (Winter 1997).
Horowitz, Donald L. “Democracy in Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 4 
(October 1993).
Howard, Marc Morjé. “Free not to Participate: The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-
Communist Europe.” Studies in Public Policy no. 325. Glasgow: University of
Stathclyde, 2000.
Hudson, Michael C. “Democratization in the Middle East: The Possibilities for Pluralism.”
American-Arab Affairs 36 (Spring 1991), 3-5.
Human Rights Watch. “Elections in Egypt” (October 2000),
<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/egypt-election-bck.htm>.
“Egypt: Human Rights Developments” (2004),
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/WR93/Mew-02.htm#P136_63066>.
. “Divorced From Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to Divorce in Egypt” (2004)
<http://hrw.org/reports/2004/egypt1204/>.
International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington:
The Fund, 2001.
Ismail, Salwa. International Journal of Middle East Studies 30 (May, 1998), 199-225.
Langohr, Vickie. “Middle East Studies After 9/11: An Exit from Arab Autocracy.” Journal of
Democracy 13 (July 2002), 116-122.
Lögren, Hans. “Economic Policy in Egypt: A Breakdown in Reform Resistance?”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (August 1993), 407-421.
Remmer, Karen L. “The Sustainability of Political Democracy: Lessons from South
America.” Comparative Political Studies 29 (December 1996), 611-634.
Rose, Richard. “How Muslims View Democracy: Evidence from Central Asia.” Journal of
Democracy 13 (October 2002), 102-111.
Ross, Michael L. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53 (April 2001), 325-361.
Sadowski, Yahya. “The Sphinx’s New Riddle: Why Does Egypt Delay Economic Reform.”
American-Arab Affairs 22 (Fall 1987), 28-40.
Stepan , Alfred and Graeme B. Robertson. “An ‘Arab’ More Than ‘Muslim’ Electoral Gap.”
Journal of Democracy 14 (July 2003), 30-44.
The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia. “Survey of
Economic and Social Developments in the ESCWA Region.” (2004) 
<http://www.escwa.org.lb/information/publications/ead/docs/sum04e.pdf>.
. “Where do Arab Women Stand in the Development Process?  A Gender Based 
Statistical Analysis” (2004).
<http://www.escwa.org.lb/information/publications/sdd/docs/sdd-04-booklet.1.pdf>.
Weiner, Myron. “Empirical Democratic Theory.” Competitive Elections in Developing 
Countries. Myron Weiner and Ergun Özbudun, eds. Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1987.
World Bank Group, The. “Gender Stats.” (2004) 
<http://devdata.worldbank.org/genderstats/query/default.htm>.
38 Res Publica
